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COMMENT: MULTI-DISCIPLINARY
PRACTICE AND
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
Kevin C. McMunigalt
My comments as part of this panel focus on the attitude of proponents of multi-disciplinary practice toward conflict of interest. Before turning to that topic, I would like to offer a general observation
about the debate on multi-disciplinary practice as well as a suggestion
for improving the quality of that debate.
I. MULTI-DISCIPLINARY SERVICE VS. MULTI-DISCIPLINARY
PARTNERSHIP

In much of what I read on the virtues and vices of multidisciplinary practice, the competing sides seem to argue past one another and fail to join issue. Those in favor of multi-disciplinary practice focus on the benefits of multi-disciplinary service, the idea that
clients often benefit when provided service that draws on the skills
and learning not just of lawyers but of professionals in other fields
ranging from family psychology to finance and accounting. They
point out that client problems are often and increasingly multidisciplinary, having non-legal as well as legal facets. These multifaceted problems, it is argued, call for multi-disciplinary solutions.
This "holistic" view of client problems and the appropriate solutions to them seems irrefutable. Far from being unethical, one might
well argue that the ethical mandate of competence' should require
lawyers to draw on other disciplines if their clients' problems call for
it.
How, though, should lawyers go about providing multidisciplinary service? This strikes me as the key question in the multidisciplinary practice debate. Those opposed to multi-disciplinary
practice, as one might anticipate, do not seem to challenge the value
of multi-disciplinary service. Rather, their critique focuses on one
particular model for providing multi-disciplinary service-the multit Judge Ben C. Green Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of
Law.
I See MODEL RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCTR. 1.1 (2000).
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disciplinary partnership, in which professionals from various disciplines throw their lots together through the legal device of partnership, sharing both risks and rewards.
Lacking in much of what I read in the debate on multidisciplinary practice is careful examination of the comparative advantages and disadvantages of different models for offering clients multidisciplinary service. Partnership among lawyers and other professionals is one model. The "loose alliance" described by Professor Wolfram is another model. Professor Terry provides still other models.
Each has its advantages and disadvantages. The pooling of risk inherent in the partnership model, for example, has the advantage of creating a benign incentive for the lawyer to carefully select and monitor
her non-lawyer partners who provide service to her client. But the
pooling of reward also inherent in partnership has the disadvantage of
creating a perverse incentive for the lawyer to choose her non-lawyer
partners to provide service to her client even if other non-lawyer professionals outside her partnership are more competent or less expensive than her non-lawyer partners, since the lawyer may share in the
profits generated by her non-lawyer partners.
The debate on multi-disciplinary practice, in my view, would
benefit if both the proponents and opponents of multi-disciplinary
practice explored, compared, and evaluated the comparative advantages and disadvantages of the various models for delivering multidisciplinary service. The opponents of multi-disciplinary practice focus their attention rather narrowly on the disadvantages of multidisciplinary partnership. Their critique would be more informative
and compelling if they conceded that multi-disciplinary partnership
may have some advantages and then told us why on balance the vices
and virtues of such partnerships are inferior to the comparative vices
and virtues of other models for delivering multi-disciplinary service.
The proponents of multi-disciplinary partnership would similarly help
inform the multi-disciplinary practice debate if, rather than simply
reiterating the attractiveness of multi-disciplinary service, they focused their attention on a comparative cost/benefit analysis of various
models for providing such service.
I. CONFLICT OF INTEREST RULES AND MDPs

I preface my comments on multi-disciplinary practice and conflict of interest by setting Model Rule 5.4,2 a focal point in that debate, in context by looking at how ethics rules in general and conflict
of interest rules in particular deal with risk. Doing so helps us to un2

Id. at R. 5.4 (2000).
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derstand and assess both Model Rule 5.4 and proposals by advocates
of multi-disciplinary practice to abandon its restrictions.
A. Harm vs. Risk
Legal ethics rules often deploy dual strategies focused respectively on harm and risk in seeking to achieve a particular objective.
Rules on solicitation, for example, seek to prevent lawyers in pursuit
of new business from misleading, coercing, or invading the privacy of
potential clients. Model Rule 7.3(b)(2) reflects a harm strategy for
advancing this objective, prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in solicitation of prospective clients that "involves coercion, duress, or
harassment." 4 Simultaneously, Model Rule 7.3(a) supplements Rule
7.3(b)(2)'s harm strategy with a risk strategy. It sets forth a general
ban on personal solicitation,5 regardless of whether it involves the
coercion, duress, or harassment sanctioned by Rule 7.3(b)(2).
Model Rule 7.3(a)'s general anti-solicitation rule is warranted by
a combination of two factors: significant risk and proof difficulties.
The Comment to Rule 7.3, for example, speaks of "the potentialfor
abuse inherent in direct in-person or live telephone solicitation of
prospective clients." 6 Rule 7.3(a) creates an exception for those with
whom the lawyer has a "family or prior professional relationship" and
lawyers not motivated by pecuniary gain.7 The Comment to Rule 7.3
again refers to risk in justifying these exceptions. "There is far less
likelihood that a lawyer would engage in abusive practices against an
individual with whom the lawyer has a prior personal or professional
relationship or where the lawyer is8 motivated by considerations other
than the lawyer's pecuniary gain."
Personal solicitation gives rise to proof difficulties since it typically takes the form of unrecorded oral statements to which the only
witnesses are the soliciting lawyer and the potential client. If the bar
seeks to enforce Model Rule 7.3(b)(2)'s harm strategy by proving
actual coercion, duress, or harassment, it bears the burden of proof.
Often the best the bar can offer to meet this burden is the uncorrobo3 See id. at R. 7.3 (2000).
4 Id. at R. 7.3(b)(2) ("A lawyer shall not solicit professional employment from a prospective client by written or recorded communication or by in-person or telephone contact even
when not otherwise prohibited... if:... (2) the solicitation involves coercion, duress, or harassment.").
5 Id. at R. 7.3(a) ("A lawyer shall not by in-person or live telephone contact solicit professional employment from a prospective client with whom the lawyer has no family or prior
professional relationship when a significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's
pecuniary gain.").
6 Id. at R. 7.3 cmt.2 (emphasis added).
7 Id. at R. 7.3(a).
8 Id at R. 7.3 cmt.4 (emphasis added).
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rated word of the person who was the target of the solicitation against
the lawyer's word. Due to physical or emotional trauma, the prospective client in need of legal services may have difficulty remembering
and recounting the lawyer's statements well enough to make an effective witness. Accordingly, it is often difficult for the bar effectively to
monitor and enforce the line at which the risks posed by personal solicitation materialize into actual coercion, duress, or harassment. Such
practical proof problems reduce the certainty of enforcement of
Model Rule 7.3(b)(2)'s harm strategy and thus undermine its deterrent effect.
The Comment to Model Rule 7.3 emphasizes these proof difficulties by comparing in-person solicitation to advertisements and
other communications permitted by Model Rule 7.2:
The contents of advertisements and communications permitted under Rule 7.2 are permanently recorded so that they
cannot be disputed and may be shared with others who know
the lawyer. This potential for informal review is itself likely
to help guard against statements and claims that might constitute false and misleading communications, in violation of
Rule 7.1. The contents of direct in-person or live telephone
conversations between a lawyer and a prospective client can
be disputed and are not subject to third-party scrutiny. Consequently, they are much more likely to approach (and occasionally cross) the dividing line between accurate
representa9
tions and those that are false and misleading.
Risk strategies such as Model Rule 7.3(a)'s general ban on personal solicitation seek to alleviate such proof problems by barring the
lawyer from being in situations in which they arise. If the lawyer is
prohibited from soliciting a potential client, then he will not have the
opportunity to engage in "coercion, duress, or harassment" while soliciting that potential client.
Ambiguity about whether conflict of interest rules are based on a
harm or a risk strategy has plagued attorney conflict of interest doctrine.10 But the modern approach to conflicts distinguishes between
harm and risk strategies and views conflict of interest as based on
risk. The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, for example,
defines a conflict of interest as "a substantial risk that the lawyer's
9 Id. at R. 7.3 cmt.3.
10 See Kevin C. McMunigal, Rethinking Attorney Conflict of Interest Doctrine, 5 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 823, 834-42 (1992) (describing three basic approaches reflected in rules governing lawyer conflict of interest as the (1) harm or resulting impairment approach; (2) risk avoidance approach; and (3) appearance of impropriety approach and noting the current failure to
differentiate among these approaches).
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representation of the client would be materially and adversely affected by the lawyer's own interests or by the lawyer's duties to another current client, a former client, or a third person.""
As in the area of solicitation, the combination of risk and proof
difficulties warrants the use of a risk strategy in dealing with conflict
of interest. Attorney conflict of interest issues vary greatly in apparent
form and arise in a wide variety of factual settings. 12 But the common
feature they share is concern with the risks posed by perverse incentives that threaten fulfillment of a lawyer's obligations.' 3 The decisions lawyers make on behalf of clients often require complex judgments involving many factors that cannot be measured with precision.
The process by which lawyers resolve such questions is largely internal and thus not easily subject to proof by the bar or a client. Thus,
just as with Rule 7.3(b)(2)'s rule against lawyers engaging in "coercion, duress, or harassment" of clients during solicitation, a harm
strategy requiring the bar or clients to prove that a particular perverse
incentive adversely affected the lawyer's representation of the client
is hard to enforce and its deterrent effectiveness accordingly is lessened. The central thrust of conflict of interest doctrine is to anticipate
and preempt such problems by barring the lawyer from putting herself
in the risk situation.
B. ParticularRisk Rules
In addition to general conflict of interest rules such as those
mentioned above, attorney conflict of interest doctrine deploys other
particular risk rules in certain contexts, again typically ones combining risk and proof difficulties. Model Rule 1.8(c), for example, bars a
lawyer from preparing a will giving the lawyer "any substantial gift"
from the client. 14 In this situation, the lawyer's economic self-interest
and the possibility of an elderly or otherwise vulnerable client create a
risk of undue influence, distorted advice, and fraud on the part of the
lawyer. Any such malfeasance by the lawyer is often hard to prove at
the time the instrument becomes effective because the testator is dead.
Other witnesses to undue influence, distorted advice, or fraud by the
lawyer will often be hard to find because lawyers typically confer

II RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 121 (2000) (emphasis
added).
12 McMunigal, supra note 10, at 829.

13 Id. at 83 1.
14 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R 1.8(c) (2000) ("A lawyer shall not prepare an
instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer as parent, child, sibling, or spouse
any substantial gift from a client, including a testamentary gift, except where the client is related

to the donee.").
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privately with clients, and clients are often reluctant to share the details of their testamentary affairs with others.15
Model Rule 1.9(a), another particular conflict of interest rule,
codifies what is often referred to as the "substantial relationship test."
In similar fashion to Model Rule 7.3(a) and 1.8(c), it bars the lawyer
from putting herself in a risky situation in which it is difficult for the
bar to prove actual wrongdoing by the lawyer. The rules of confidentiality bar a lawyer from divulging a former client's confidential information. But 1.9(a) uses a risk strategy to supplement this harm rule
with a conflict of interest rule prohibiting the lawyer from representing a client whose interests are adverse to a former client when the
present and former representations are the same or substantially related 16 because such situations pose an unacceptably high risk of
breach of confidentiality. As explained by Judge Posner in an often
cited case:
For rather obvious reasons a lawyer is prohibited from
using confidential information that he has obtained from a
client against that client on behalf of another one. But this
prohibition has not seemed enough by itself to make clients
feel secure about reposing confidences in lawyers, so a further prohibition has evolved: a lawyer may not represent an
adversary of his former client if the subject matter of the
two representations is "substantially related," which means:
if the lawyer could have obtained confidential information
in the first representation that would have been relevant in
the second. It is irrelevant whether he actually obtained
such information and used it against his former client ....
Underlying the substantial relationship test one again finds the
dual concerns of risk and practical proof difficulties. The coexistence
of adverse interests between the former and present clients and a substantial relationship between the subject matter of the two representations creates an unacceptable risk that the lawyer will compromise his
15 See Krischbaum v. Dillon, 567 N.E.2d 1291, 1296 (Ohio 1991) (noting that attorneyclient conversations related to wills and estate planning require the utmost privacy, because
there the client reveals his innermost thoughts and feelings, which he may not wish to share with
his spouse, children, and others).
16

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDuCr R. 1.9(a) (2000) ("A lawyer who has formerly

represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a
substantially related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests
of the former client unless the former client consents after consultation.").
17 Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc., 708 F.2d 1263, 1266 (7th Cir. 1983) (affirming
the disqualification of a law firm from representing a plaintiff in a lawsuit in which the firm had
previously represented the opposing party in a substantially related matter).
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obligation to maintain as confidential information gained in the
course of representing the former client. Since the lawyer's conversations with the present client are typically private as well as protected
by both confidentiality and privilege, it is extremely difficult for the
former client or the bar to monitor the lawyer and effectively enforce
the confidentiality rule to make sure that the former client's confidential information is not in fact revealed to the present client or used
against the former client.
C. Model Rule 5.4
How do risk rules governing solicitation, drafting wills, and relations with former clients relate to multi-disciplinary practice? What
do the distinction between risk and harm strategies and the reasons for
adopting risk strategies in legal ethics in general and in the area of
conflict of interest in particular have to do with lawyers going into
partnership with non-lawyers? My objective in describing some of the
various risk strategies commonly used in legal ethics is to provide a
perspective from which to understand and evaluate both Model Rule
5.4 and the proposals of the advocates of multi-disciplinary practice
for abandoning its restrictions.
Model Rule 5.4 sets forth two particularized rules that reflect
risk strategies similar to those underlying the ethical risk rules discussed above regarding solicitation, will drafting, and former clients.
Model Rule 5.4 prohibits a lawyer from: (1) sharing legal fees with a
nonlawyer or (2) forming a partnership with a nonlawyer.18 The concerns here are typical of those which drive conflict of interest rules.
Sharing fees and forming partnerships with non-lawyers create risk by
exposing the lawyer to perverse incentives that threaten fulfillment of
the lawyer's obligations to his client. Both the bar and clients will
have difficulty proving if and when lawyers succumb to those incentives in ways that adversely affect representation of their clients.

18 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2000). This section states:

(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not sharelegalfees with a nonlawyer, except that:
(1) an agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer's firm, partner, or associate may provide
for the payment of money, over a reasonable period of time after the lawyer's death, to the
lawyer's estate or to one or more specified persons;
(2) a lawyer who purchases the practice of a deceased, disabled, or disappeared lawyer
may, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 1.17, pay to the estate or other representative of that
lawyer the agreed-upon purchase price; and
(3) a lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a compensation or retirement plan, even though the plan is based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement.
(b) A lawyer shall notform a partnershipwith a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the
partnership consist of the practice of law.
Id. at R. 5.4 (emphasis added).
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If we view Rule 5.4's prohibitions as based on a risk strategy,
they are consistent in their theoretical stance with the many risk rules
one finds throughout the field of legal ethics. Specifically, they are
consistent with the central thrust of conflict of interest doctrine, which
is to view harm strategies such as those proposed by the advocates of
multi-disciplinary practice as insufficient to protect the client.
What the advocates of multi-disciplinary partnership propose is
to abandon Rule 5.4's risk strategy in favor of a harm strategy of
sanctioning individual lawyers who allow incentives arising from
multi-disciplinary fee sharing and partnership to adversely affect their
representation of clients. The idea of relying exclusively on harm
rules runs counter to the use of risk strategies throughout the field of
legal ethics and especially to the basic thrust of conflict of interest
doctrine. In this sense, this proposal clearly is at odds with a basic
value of the legal profession about risk-taking by lawyers embodied
in its conflict of interest rules.
Critics may describe Model Rule 5.4 as paternalistic toward clients. Risk strategies by nature are paternalistic in the sense that they
seek to safeguard clients in situations in which either the bar or the
client would have difficulty enforcing some underlying harm rule.
The argument that Model Rule 5.4 should be eliminated because it is
paternalistic is not compelling. The same sort of paternalism is found
in many ethics rules and underlies the entire field of conflict of interest. If the fact that Rule 5.4 is paternalistic is enough to invalidate
Rule 5.4, why stop with Model Rule 5.4? The same logic would lead
us to abandon each of the rules described above, such as Model Rule
7.3(a)'s ban on solicitation, 1.8(c), 1.9(a), and even the general prohibition on conflict of interest.
Critics may also describe Rule 5.4 as overbroad in preemptively
restricting both lawyers who would in fact resist the temptation of
whatever perverse incentives multi-disciplinary practice may create as
well as those lawyers who would succumb. Again, the description is
accurate but the mere fact that Model Rule 5.4 is overbroad is not a
compelling argument for doing away with it. All risk strategies are
overbroad. For example, the general ban on personal solicitation
surely prevents some lawyers from personally soliciting potential clients who would not in fact engage in coercion, duress, or harassment.
If over-inclusiveness is accepted as reason enough for invalidating a
risk rule, it would invalidate all the risk rules mentioned above.
The essential question is whether the greater protection afforded
clients by these rules justifies admittedly overbroad restrictions on
ethical lawyers who do not mistreat their clients. A risk strategy
places greater value on protection of clients than on lawyer freedom
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to engage in certain behavior-whether it is forming partnerships
with non-lawyers, soliciting potential clients, drafting wills that give
the lawyer a gift, suing former clients, or putting herself in a position
we define as a conflict of interest.
My objective here is not to defend Model Rule 5.4. Rather, my
goal is to demonstrate that the strategy underlying Rule 5.4 is one
commonly used in legal ethics. Advocates of multi-disciplinary partnership seem to fail to appreciate both the compelling reasons why
risk strategies are adopted and the fact that legal ethics rules generally
and conflict of interest rules in particular rely on such strategies. They
seem either oblivious to or naYve, for example, about the practical
proof difficulties of enforcing harm rules against lawyers.
Resolving the debate about multi-disciplinary partnership is well
beyond the scope of my brief comments. I want to end by suggesting
some ways in which I think advocates of multi-disciplinary partnership could reframe their arguments to make a more compelling case
for abandoning Model Rule 5.4.
First, advocates might acknowledge the risks posed by multidisciplinary partnership but argue that the magnitude of those risks is
not great enough to warrant the risk strategy reflected in Rule 5.4.'9
Multi-disciplinary partnership increases the range of potentially perverse incentives to which the lawyer is exposed. And those incentives
fall outside the routine experience of lawyers, making assessment of
them by the bar difficult. Those risks, however, may not be any worse
in kind or degree than other incentives we now allow lawyers to encounter without running afoul of conflict of interest rules.
Second, critics of Rule 5.4 could argue that whatever risks are
posed by multi-disciplinary partnership are justified by the gains to
clients resulting from multi-disciplinary partnership. 20 Contingent
fees are often criticized, for example, because these fees create a risk
that a lawyer will place her economic self-interest ahead of the interests of clients. Despite these risks, contingent fees are allowed
primarily because there is a good reason for taking the risks they
pose. Contingent fees promote access to counsel for many clients who
otherwise would be unrepresented. Advocates of multi-disciplinary
partnership may be able to make a convincing case that similarly the
risks associated with multi-disciplinary partnership are justified by
the benefits such partnerships produce.

19 See McMunigal, supra note 10, at 861-69 on the role of magnitude of risk in conflict of
interest analysis.
20 See Ud at 869-71 on the role ofjustifiability in conflict of interest analysis.
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CONCLUSION
Lawyers providing multi-disciplinary service to clients strikes
me as both desirable and inevitable. Whether such multi-disciplinary
service should be provided by means of multi-disciplinary partnership
is a more difficult question. I suggested at the outset of my comments
that rejection of Model Rule 5.4 and acceptance of multi-disciplinary
partnership should turn on careful assessment of the advantages and
disadvantages of multi-disciplinary partnership in comparison with
other models for delivering multi-disciplinary service to clients. Such
an assessment is impossible without recognition of and appreciation
for the risk strategy which underlies conflict of interest prohibitions in
general and Model Rule 5.4 in particular.

